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THE NEXT STEP IN CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
REFORM: PASSING THE CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
REFORM ACT OF 2014
Daniel Reed+
One of our most cherished notions as American citizens is that our private
property should be secure.1 People should not have their property taken away
without due process of law, and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
codifies this fundamental principle. 2 Considering the importance of private
property in our society, 3 the American people might assume that the federal
government would do everything in its power to uphold basic property rights.
However, in the murky world of civil asset forfeiture, this is not the case.
Consider the story of Lyndon McLellan: an average citizen and convenience
store owner living in North Carolina.4 Acting on the advice of his local bank
teller, he kept his deposits of convenience store profits below $10,000 to save
his bank burdensome paperwork.5 He could not have predicted that his wellintentioned act would get him into trouble with the United States Government.6
In July 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seized all $107,702.66 of
McLellan’s bank account without notice, accusing him of unlawfully
“structuring” deposits to avoid reporting requirements.7 Despite never being
charged with a crime, McLellan suffered a protracted legal battle.8 After ten
grueling months and the intervention of a public interest law firm, the IRS finally
+
J.D. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2017; B.A. HampdenSydney College, 2012. The author would like to thank Professor Brooks B. Singer for providing
invaluable guidance, suggestions, corrections, and for sharing his time and expertise. The author
would also like to thank Alyson Parker Kierzewski, Janine Bakalis, Jenn Bruneau, and the editors
and staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their assistance in editing and publishing this
Note.
1. ROGER PILON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: EUROPE AND
AMERICA 3–4 (2008), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/pilon_031009.pdf.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A person shall not be “be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” Id.
3. See PILON, supra note 1, at 1–2, 7–8 (discussing private property rights under the
Constitution and the importance attached to such rights by the Framers).
4. Jason Pye, This Business Owner Fought IRS Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Forced
the Government to Return $107,000 of Wrongfully Seized Cash, FREEDOMWORKS (May 20, 2015),
http://www.freedomworks.org/content/business-owner-fought-irs-abuse-civil-asset-forfeitureand-forced-government-return-107000.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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returned his money.9 Unfortunately, McLellan’s story is far more common than
one might expect.
Thousands of forfeiture cases are prosecuted annually in the United States and
frequently involve owners who have not been charged with a crime in
connection to the forfeited property.10 Such forfeitures are known as “civil asset
forfeitures” (or “civil forfeitures”) because the proceedings are non-criminal and
are considered to be against the property in rem rather than against the owner as
a defendant. 11 Civil asset forfeiture can be greatly effective when taking
property from criminal organizations and depriving people with unclean hands
from benefitting from illegal activity. 12 Unfortunately, the lax regulations
surrounding civil asset forfeiture have created an environment where abuse can
thrive, with law enforcement often pursuing civil forfeitures out of inappropriate
financial motivations. 13 As a result, many innocent people have found
themselves caught in a dragnet originally intended to repurpose the assets of
hardened criminals and scofflaws.14
With stories of questionable forfeitures becoming commonplace in the news,
some members of Congress took notice of the inadequate protections offered
under current civil asset forfeiture laws. On July 28, 2014, Representative Tim
Walberg (R-MI) introduced a bill titled the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2014 (CAFRA 2014).15 The Act proposes some important changes to federal
civil asset forfeiture laws, including raising the burden of proof, expanding
9. Id.
10. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 101
(2007), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/nmls.pdf. A
report from the Department of the Treasury noted that in fiscal year 2004 the Department of Justice
filed 3,785 criminal asset forfeiture cases and 2,235 civil forfeiture cases. See Eric Blumenson &
Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35,
48–49 (1998) (“There is no constitutional requirement that the property owner be at fault, or be
prosecuted for the underlying criminal activity.”).
11. Jennifer Levesque, Property Rights - When Reform Is Not Enough: A Look Inside the
Problems Created by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 59,
65–66 (2015). An action in rem is “an action determining the title to property and the rights of the
parties, not merely among themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest
in that property; a real action.” See Action in Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
In rem translated from Latin means “against a thing.” Id. at In Rem.
12. Rachel L. Stuteville, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law Enforcement Has
Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of Local
Government – The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is On, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1178–79 (2014).
13. Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility – The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1046,
1073–74 (2002) (discussing several flaws in current civil asset forfeiture laws and the government’s
financial motivation in civil forfeiture cases).
14. HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM
SEIZURE 5–6 (1995); see also Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access
to Counsel and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87
(2001).
15. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014).
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notice of the right to counsel, and broadening proportionality considerations.16
However, it quickly became bogged down in Congressional inefficiency, and
gathered dust on the shelf of the House Judiciary Committee for over three
years.17 This Note will argue that CAFRA 2014 should pass because previous
attempts at civil asset forfeiture reform have provided inadequate protection to
the American people from civil forfeiture abuse.
Of the previous forfeiture reforms, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000 (CAFRA 2000) had the most impact.18 CAFRA 2000 established some
basic protections for property owners involved in forfeiture proceedings. 19
Ultimately, however, it did not do enough to protect citizens from civil forfeiture
abuse.20 CAFRA 2000’s burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence
standard, which is an inappropriately light standard for the government to
prove.21 While the innocent owner defense is available, the burden of proof is
improperly placed on the claimant to show that he or she is an innocent owner.22
CAFRA 2000’s notice requirements, proportionality standards, and equitable
sharing restrictions are all inadequate to afford individuals appropriate
protection from forfeiture abuse.23
After discussing the history of civil asset forfeiture, this Note analyzes
CAFRA 2014 and examines its potential impact on the civil asset forfeiture
process. This Note then reviews some deficiencies with current federal civil
forfeiture laws and will examine the proposed changes in CAFRA 2014. After
considering the positive impact that the proposed changes could have on civil
asset forfeiture, this Note argues that Congress should pass CAFRA 2014 to
provide beneficial reforms to federal civil asset forfeiture laws.
I. FORFEITURE THROUGH THE AGES
A. From Exodus to the King’s Treasury
The modern concept of civil asset forfeiture originated from an ancient legal
fiction dating back to biblical times. 24 A legal fiction exists when a fact is
16. Id.
17. H.R. 5212 (113th): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5212 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983 (2012 & Supp. III 2016); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 1046,
1073–74; see generally Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000).
19. §§ 981, 983.
20. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1046.
21. See Levesque, supra note 11, at 76–78.
22. Darpana M. Sheth, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Forfeiture Laws, 14 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 24, 27 (2013).
23. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014). See
discussion infra Part I.F–K.
24. See Isaiah M. Hunter, The War on Drugs and Taxes: How Tax Expenditure Analysis Can
Shed Light on Civil Asset Forfeiture, 9 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 549, 551 (2015) (explaining that “civil
asset forfeiture is rooted in the ancient legal fiction of the deodand,” which required property “used
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assumed or created by an interpreting authority to justify a particular rule or
operation of law.25 In the forfeiture context, an example of the legal fiction at
work can be seen in the book of Exodus, which stated “when an ox gores a man
or woman to death, the ox must be stoned; its flesh may not be eaten. The owner
of the ox, however, shall go unpunished.”26 The idea was that chattel involved
in a harmful act against humans was guilty of an offense against God’s “divinely
ordained hierarchy of creation,” and could subsequently be destroyed for crimes
of “high treason.”27
Medieval English scholars used biblical, Anglo-Saxon, and Roman traditions
to create the first rudimentary forfeiture laws.28 Building on the pre-Norman
conquest practice of “noxal surrender,” which involved the gift of an animal or
object causing death or serious injury (known as a “bane”) to a victim’s family
as compensation, 29 scholars developed the concept of the deodand. The
deodand, mistranslated from the Latin “deo dandum” meaning “given to God,”
called for an object used in criminal conduct, or otherwise causing harm to a
human, to be forfeited to the English crown.30 The Coroner’s Rolls of thirteenthcentury England provide examples of the deodand at work.31 One account from
Bedfordshire mentioned a sword seized after the arrest of an armed robber in the
village of Sudbury: “[t]he township of Sudbury came with the hue and arrested
John the felon . . . The sword is worth [twelve] pence and it is delivered to the
township of Sudbury.” 32 The Coroner’s Rolls regularly mentioned seized
property that was forfeited to the crown, including such things as vessels holding
in [a] crime to be destroyed” on the grounds that it was “intrinsically evil”); Todd Barnet, Legal
Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ.
L. REV. 77, 79–80 (2001) (citing PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL
SCIENCE 81 (1975)) (discussing the nature of a legal fiction, including a quotation from Professor
Olivier who stated “a legal fiction is an assumption of fact deliberately, lawfully, and irrebutably
made contrary to the facts proven or probable in a particular case, with the object of bringing a
particular legal rule into operation or explaining a legal rule, the assumption being permitted by
law or employed in legal science.”).
25. See Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An assumption that
something is true even though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal
rule operates; specif., a device by which a legal rule or institution is diverted from its original
purpose to accomplish indirectly some other object.”).
26. Exodus 21:28.
27. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 180–81
(1973).
28. Id. at 181–82.
29. Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 237, 241 (2005).
30. Barnet, supra note 24, at 87.
31. See SELECT CASES FROM THE CORONERS’ ROLLS, A.D. 1265–1413 (Charles Gross ed.,
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1895).
32. Id. at 2. To finish the story, the Coroners’ Rolls state that “the said John, Richard
Herbert’s son, struck William the Shepard with a sword on the right side of his head and cut away
a portion of the head with the brains and the right ear, so that he died forthwith on the said bridge.”
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boiling substances that scalded people to death. 33 The deodand could also
include property unrelated to the cause of death of a victim, such as a lamb
belonging to a murderer.34 The deodand continued throughout medieval and
early-modern England,35 and vestiges of the concept followed British settlers to
the United States,36 despite widespread antipathy towards the practice.
B. Forfeiture in the New Republic
In light of some hated British practices—such as the granting of Writs of
Assistance, which gave crown officials a commission on seized goods—
forfeiture was a detested practice in the American colonies. 37 Despite
philosophical opposition, civil asset forfeiture took hold in the United States in
several forms out of practical necessity.38
Admiralty law was one area where civil asset forfeiture was commonly used.39
American legislatures grudgingly embraced civil asset forfeiture in this context
as an important tool to combat maritime offenses and enforce customs laws.40
One famous U.S. Supreme Court case involved the forfeiture of a Spanish pirate
ship, The Palmyra.41 Justice Story, writing the opinion for the court, affirmed
the use of forfeitures in rem to seize property without a corresponding conviction
of the property owner. 42 Ship owners guilty of smuggling or piracy were
33. Id. at 15.
34. Id.
35. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (stating that
“English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending objects used in violation of the
customs and revenue laws—likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition
and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer”); Finkelstein, supra
note 27, at 170 (observing that the deodand continued to operate in England until it was statutorily
abolished in 1846).
36. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (citing C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139
(1943)) (“Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies—
and later in the states during the period of Confederation—were exercising jurisdiction in rem in
the enforcement of (English and local) forfeiture statutes . . . .”); see also J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.,
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (noting that although courts may question the
propriety of asset forfeiture, “it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced”).
37. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 10, at 75–76; Brant C. Hadaway, Executive Privateers:
A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the
Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 89 (2000).
38. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
39. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 344 (1813) (upholding the forfeiture of a
ship’s cargo for violations of customs laws); Brent Skorup, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection
from Excessive Fines in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 427, 433 (2012).
40. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 43 (1996);
Barnet, supra note 24, at 91.
41. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1827).
42. Justice Story’s opinion entrenched the constitutional legitimacy of civil in rem forfeitures.
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difficult to prosecute in person because they were often absent and far outside
the court’s jurisdiction.43 As such, the ability to gain in rem jurisdiction over
vessels and cargo was quite useful in fighting nautical crimes because a
“suspicious vessel could be arrested and prosecuted by name by the government,
and the law treated the ship as if it were a guilty person.”44
C. Bootleggers, Mules, and Automobiles
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, civil asset forfeiture was often
applied to violations of liquor smuggling and tax evasion laws.45 In one amusing
case, a North Carolina district court ordered the owner of two hired mules to
forfeit them because they had been used without his knowledge to illegally
transport liquor.46 Actions against bootleggers continued to be a major operation
of civil asset forfeiture through the early twentieth century, particularly in
conjunction with the rise of automobiles as forfeitable property.47 For example,
in Van Oster v. Kansas,48 an owner lent her vehicle to a car dealership, that then
lent it to a third party, who was caught illegally smuggling liquor inside the

He wrote:
[T]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum, or malum in
se. The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the Admiralty. Many
cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no
accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture
in rem and a personal penalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever been decided that
the prosecutions were dependent upon each other. But the practice has been, and so this
Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and
wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.
Id. at 14–15. This opinion remains an important reference for forfeiture law and has been cited by
the Court in more recent opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330–31
(1998); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in
U.S. Currency, No. 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442, 446–47 (1996); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683–84 (1974).
43. Skorup, supra note 39, at 433. The Palmyra, for example, was a Spanish ship sailing out
of Puerto Rico. Although it is unclear who exactly owned the ship, if the owner were located in
Spain or elsewhere around the world one can easily imagine the difficulty of bringing him to trial
in the United States. See The Palymra, 25 U.S. at 3, 5–6.
44. Barnet, supra note 24, at 90.
45. See Dobbins’ Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1877) (finding that
property of landowner who leased his distillery to an operator who subsequently committed tax
fraud was forfeitable, regardless of the fact that the landowner was unaware of the fraud); LEVY,
supra note 40, at 58–59.
46. United States v. Two Bay Mules, 36 F. 84, 84 (W.D.N.C. 1888).
47. See United States v. One Saxon Auto., 257 F. 251, 251 (4th Cir. 1919); Logan v. United
States, 260 F. 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1919); Joel T. Kornfeld & Anthony A. De Corso, Uncivil
Forfeitures: Skillful Practitioners Can Take Advantage of the Newly Available Remedies to Undo
Unjustified Civil Forfeitures, 26 L.A. LAW. 39, 40 (2003).
48. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
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vehicle.49 Although the owner challenged the forfeiture on the grounds that she
had no knowledge of the third party’s behavior or intention, the Supreme Court
upheld the forfeiture.50 Such bootlegger actions were common, and the use of
civil asset forfeiture in this capacity remained prevalent up until the “War on
Drugs” beginning in the 1970s.51
D. Forfeiture During the Drug Wars
In the 1970s, the “War on Drugs,” as it is now called, propelled civil asset
forfeiture from an intermittently used principle targeting bootleggers and taxevaders into a ubiquitous and controversial law enforcement weapon.52 When
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act passed in 1970, it
gave law enforcement enhanced ability to seize property connected to drug
crimes.53 In 1978, Congress amended the law to broaden the types of property
subject to forfeiture.54 In 1984, Congress further amended the statute to include
real property55 and eliminated the requirement that forfeited assets be placed in
the U.S. Treasury Department’s general fund.56 This enabled law enforcement
agencies to seize property for their own benefit, with much less oversight and
supervision.57 Notorious cases of forfeiture abuse came to light, drawing public
outcry and provoking action in Congress. 58 Organizations from across the
49. Id. at 466.
50. Id. at 468–69.
51. Passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in 1970
dramatically increased the usage of civil asset forfeiture. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1616a (2012)
(providing statutory authority for equitable sharing programs, which will be discussed later in this
Note); 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 881 (2012) (providing statutory authority for federal asset forfeiture,
including which types of property are subject to forfeiture); Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34.
52. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1045, 1049–1050 (discussing some of the changes to
forfeiture laws resulting from the War on Drugs); Levesque, supra note 11, at 67–69 (observing
that the changes brought “increased criticism over the state of the civil asset forfeiture laws”).
53. Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34.
54. The 1978 amendment added “moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things
of value furnished . . . in exchange for a controlled substance [to be forfeited].” Psychotropic
Substances Act of 1978, S. 2399, 95th Cong. (1978) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6)(1994)). See also GREGORY M. VECCHI & ROBERT T. SIGLER, ASSETS FORFEITURE: A
STUDY OF POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE 46 (2001); Skorup, supra note 39, at 433–34.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); Johnson, supra note 13, at 1050.
56. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1050.
57. See generally Marian R. Williams et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset
Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 1, 6 (2010).
58. Several courts began to question whether the government was properly using civil asset
forfeiture. In one instance, the Seventh Circuit proffered a stinging rebuke of the government’s
attempt to seize half a million dollars in cash from a restaurateur without probable cause. United
States v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that “as has likely
been obvious from the tone of this opinion, we believe the government’s conduct in forfeiture cases
leaves much to be desired”). The Second Circuit also voiced concern over the conduct of forfeiture
proceedings. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating “we continue to be enormously troubled by the government’s increasing and virtually
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political spectrum called for civil forfeiture reform and finally compelled
Congress to act in the mid-1990s.59
E. Battle Lines in Congress
Representative Henry Hyde (R. IL) led the effort that would eventually lead
Congress to pass CAFRA 2000.60 In the mid-1990s, Rep. Hyde presided over
several hearings before the House Judiciary Committee where witnesses
testified about instances of civil forfeiture abuse and mismanagement of
forfeiture funds. 61 Rep. Hyde voiced dissatisfaction with contemporary
application of civil asset forfeiture laws, stating “civil asset forfeiture all too
often punishes innocent persons . . . We need to reform these procedures so as
to ensure fundamental fairness and due process rights.”62 He drafted and held
hearings on House Bill 1916, titled “The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,”
which proposed changes intended to curb abusive practices in civil asset
forfeiture.63 The U.S. Department of Justice proposed a counter bill, differing
in many respects to House Bill 1916.64 Representative—later Senator—Charles
Schumer (D. NY) introduced House Bill 1745 in 1997, which was a version of
the current administration’s bill.65 Several weeks later, Rep. Hyde introduced
House Bill 1835, a more expansive version of his own bill. 66 There was a
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those
statutes.”).
59. Rulli, supra note 14, at 87 (observing that forfeiture reform was supported by “such
diverse groups as the National Rifle Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American
Civil Liberties Union . . .”).
60. Rep. Hyde led several hearings before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the
abuses within the civil asset forfeiture system and was the preeminent congressional voice for
forfeiture reform. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1996). Rep. Hyde was so incensed about civil asset forfeiture
abuse that he wrote a book decrying the practice, calling it a “jurisprudential Frankenstein monster.”
See HYDE, supra note 14, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. 1 (1996). During the hearing, Representative Hyde
interviewed a man named Willie Jones who had money for his lawn business seized at the airport
despite the fact that he was never charged with a crime, after a ticket agent reported him for paying
in cash, a behavior considered suspicious. Id. at 12–14.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1996).
64. The records of the 1996 hearing contain a bill proposed by the administration with a
section-by-section analysis. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. 42 (1996) (statement of Stefan D. Casella, Deputy
Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
One major point of contention was that the DOJ wanted the preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard. See id. at 130–31.
65. The Forfeiture Act of 1997, H.R. 1745, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Stefan D. Casella,
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government Forfeiture Authority and
Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 98 (2001).
66. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1835, 105th Cong. (1997).
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hearing and discussion over the two bills on June 11, 1997.67 Later that year,
both sides formulated a compromise bill that incorporated elements of House
Bill 1835 and House Bill 1745, but it did not pass.68 Finally, Rep. Hyde was
able to get a revised version of his bill, House Bill 1658, passed in 1999.69 As
tedious as it was to pass the bill in the House of Representatives, getting it
through the Senate would also prove difficult.
Senators Jeff Sessions (R. AL) and Schumer introduced Senate Bill 1707, a
counter bill to House Bill 1658, which represented the administration’s position
and was more disposed to law enforcement.70 Two other Senators, Orrin Hatch
(R. UT) and Patrick Leahy (D. VT) “introduced another bill, [Senate Bill] 1931,
that contained most of the reform provisions that were enacted as part of CAFRA
[2000].”71 After debate on these two bills, Rep. Hyde agreed to a version of
House Bill 1658 that incorporated elements of the two Senate bills.72 With Rep.
Hyde’s endorsement, the “House passed the bill as passed by the Senate without
further amendment.”73 After four years of intense negotiation on Capitol Hill,
President Clinton signed a heavily revised bill into law, which became known
as the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.74
F. Lingering Problems with CAFRA 2000
CAFRA 2000, while undoubtedly a step in the right direction, did not do
enough to protect the people from abusive asset forfeiture practices. 75 The
government continued to engage in questionable forfeitures and critics
demanded further reforms.76 They alleged, among other things, that there were
insufficient notice requirements that failed to adequately inform claimants of
their rights.77

67. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 1835, 105th Cong. 1–2, 61–62 (1997).
68. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Casella,
supra note 65, at 99–100.
69. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999); Casella, supra
note 65, at 101. For a record of the debate, see 145 CONG. REC. H4851 (daily ed. June 24, 1999).
70. Casella, supra note 65, at 101–02.
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 97, 101–02. CAFRA 2000 was codified under 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). See 18
U.S.C. § 983 (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
75. See Rulli, supra note 14, at 88 (“CAFRA [2000] does not alter the inherent conflict of
interest that provides a powerful economic incentive for law enforcement authorities to overreach
and to evade accountability with large sums of public monies.”).
76. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1045–46, 1052.
77. Levesque, supra note 11, at 69.
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G. Insufficient Notice Requirement
The Supreme Court has held that a party must receive due process before
property is taken, and in the civil forfeiture context, this includes notice of a
proceeding and a fair opportunity to be heard. 78 CAFRA 2000’s notice
provisions allow the government to delay sending notice to potential claimants
for at least sixty days after seizing property.79 An additional concern is that,
although CAFRA 2000 provides for reduced rate or free legal representation
under some circumstances, there is no requirement that the government must
provide notice of that fact to interested parties.80 Since the government has no
obligation to inform claimants of the potential right to counsel, forfeitures are
frequently uncontested or challenged on a pro se basis. Without the assistance
of a lawyer, indigent or uneducated claimants often lack time or resources to
devote to the process.81 This is especially true when considering the strict filing
deadlines in CAFRA 2000, which provides only thirty-five days to prepare a
complaint.82
The uncertainty associated with inadequate notice is exacerbated by the fact
that appointment of counsel is discretionary in most civil asset forfeiture cases.83
Courts have repeatedly distinguished civil matters from criminal cases in the
Sixth Amendment context, emphasizing that there is no right to counsel in civil
proceedings. 84 However, CAFRA 2000 contains one situation in which a
claimant is absolutely entitled to legal aid.85 If forfeiture proceedings are against
real property used as a “primary residence” by a claimant who is financially
unable to obtain representation, then the court must appoint an attorney if the
claimant requests one.86 However, this does little for a claimant who is unaware
of this right, hence the need for a notice requirement. 87 Many seizures are

78. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i), (iv).
80. § 983(b)(1).
81. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 13; Levesque, supra note 11, at 88; see also HYDE, supra
note 14, at 32.
82. The filing requirements mandated by CAFRA 2000 are somewhat rigorous. A claimant
must file a sworn claim “identify[ing] the specific property being claimed” and “stat[ing] the
claimants interest in such property” within thirty–five days after receipt of a forfeiture notice. §
983(a)(2)(B).
83. See Rulli, supra note 14, at 89 (“While the statute does not mandate this appointment of
counsel, it does encourage courts to exercise their discretion to appoint counsel when the property
owner has standing to contest the forfeiture and asserts a claim in good faith.”).
84. See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995), as
amended (May 24, 1995) (holding that the Sixth Amendment applies exclusively to criminal
proceedings, after an indigent defendant asserted his right to counsel in a civil forfeiture
proceeding).
85. § 983(b)(2)(A).
86. Id.; see also United States v. 777 Greene Ave., 609 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
87. Rebecca Hausner, Adequacy of Notice Under CAFRA: Resolving Constitutional Due
Process Challenges to Administrative Forfeitures, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1945–46 (2015).
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uncontested because people are not adequately informed of forfeiture
proceedings, are unsure of how to contest them, or are unaware of the ability to
obtain free or reduced rate legal representation.88 Ultimately, the inadequate
notice provisions in CAFRA 2000 contribute to a deck stacked against property
owners in civil asset forfeiture cases.89
H. Light Burden of Proof
The burden of proof in federal civil asset forfeiture cases is preponderance of
the evidence.90 Preponderance of the evidence does not require the government
to “demonstrate a direct connection between [d]efendant property and the illegal
activity.”91 It only requires the government to demonstrate “that the existence
of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”92 This means that
even if a mere fifty-one percent of the evidence supports the property’s relation
to illegal activity, then the property can be subject to forfeiture. 93 The low
evidentiary bar effectively allows the government to use the lack of obvious
legitimacy as a substitute for evidence of illegitimacy.94 Although the Supreme
Court has countered assertions that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, 95 they undeniably possess essential connections to criminal law. 96
Furthermore, the Court has admitted that civil forfeiture proceedings are
88. Id. at 1932; see Eric Moores, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ.
L. REV. 777, 787 (2009) (observing that only twenty percent of property owners ever attempt to
reclaim forfeited property).
89. Hausner, supra note 87, at 1932–33.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).
91. United States v. $21,000 in U.S. Postal Money Orders and $785.00 in U.S. Currency, 298
F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
92. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-theEvidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983).
93. See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“[Preponderance of the evidence] is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the jury is
instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the
edge may be.”).
94. United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding
that a claimant’s failure to prove that income was acquired by legitimate means was sufficient to
support a forfeiture); United States v. $21,000 in U.S. Postal Money Orders and $785.00 in U.S.
Currency, 298 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (observing that “unrebutted evidence of
insufficient income does satisfy the government’s burden of proof in certain contexts”).
95. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in
U.S. Currency, No 98-56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); see also United States v.
8 Gilcrease Lane, 656 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
267, 288, 290 (1996)).
96. All forfeitures must theoretically result from some sort of connection between property
and illegal (criminal) activity. In a criminal forfeiture proceeding, the forfeiture is a result of
punishment for a criminal conviction. A criminal conviction is not necessary in a civil forfeiture
proceeding, but the government must meet the burden of proof that the property was connected to
illegal activity. See Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining both civil
and criminal forfeitures).
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partially intended to punish the owner regardless of guilt. 97 Many innocent
owners have had cash or other valuables seized under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, simply because it was unusual or suspicious to carry large
amounts of currency.98 The preponderance of the evidence standard is too easy
for overzealous prosecutors to abuse, and does not create enough of a safeguard
against frivolous forfeiture actions. 99 The Supreme Court has held that
forfeitures are disfavored and should only be done in circumstances where they
are “within both letter and spirit of the law.”100 Considering this admonishment,
CAFRA 2000 leaves much to be desired regarding the burden of proof.
I. Inadequate Innocent Owner Defense
CAFRA 2000 states that “an innocent owner’s interest in property shall not
be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute” and places the burden on the
claimant to prove by preponderance of the evidence that he or she is an innocent
owner. 101 However, the great deficiency of CAFRA 2000’s innocent owner
defense is that it requires the claimant to exercise the burden of proof.102 Forcing
a claimant to prove what he or she did not know is a fallacy; it is harder for an
individual to prove that they did not know something than for the government
to prove that they did.103 In the law’s current state, a claimant is effectively
guilty until proven innocent, despite the ubiquitous principle in our justice
system that a party is innocent until proven guilty.104 The Supreme Court has
historically admitted that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature
despite modern attempts to deny the punitive aspects of civil forfeiture laws.105
97. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
98. United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. $84,615 in U.S. Currency, 379 F.3d 496, 501–02 (8th Cir. 2004)) (holding that
“possession of a large amount of cash is ‘strong evidence’ of a connection to drug activity”);
United States v. $52,000.00, More or Less, in U.S. Currency, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (S.D.
Ala. 2007).
99. HYDE, supra note 14, at 80–81; see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 1075–1079; Shaila
Dewan, Law Lets I.R.S. Seize Accounts on Suspicion, No Crime Required, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/us/law-lets-irs-seize-accounts-on-suspicion-no-crime
-required.html?_r=0.
100. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V–8 De Luxe Coach, Motor No. 18–3306511, 307
U.S. 219, 226 (1939).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2012).
102. Id. § 983(d).
103. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1059.
104. § 983(d)(1). The statue requires a claimant to prove by preponderance of the evidence
that they are an innocent owner. But see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding
“[t]he principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law”).
105. Compare United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 293 (1996) (Kennedy J., concurring)
(“Although there is language in our cases to the contrary . . . civil in rem forfeiture is not a
punishment of the wrongdoer for his criminal offense.”), rev’d, United States v. $405,089.23 in
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Given this acknowledgement, it seems inequitable that the law forces a claimant
to affirmatively assert innocence, rather than making the government meet the
burden of proof.
The Supreme Court has taken pains to emphasize that forfeiture serves as a
deterrent, apart from its punitive nature.106 The Court has also denied that there
is a constitutional right to an innocent owner defense.107 However, it does not
seem reasonable to deter or punish a paradigmatic innocent owner, who is by
definition not guilty.108 One of the only foreseeable “deterrent” effects is that
people will be less willing to share or loan their property to others, lest the
borrower commit an illegal act and subject the property to forfeiture.109
J. Disproportionate Forfeitures
CAFRA 2000’s proportionality section states that the court “shall compare the
forfeiture to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture,” but gives no
further guidance on other proportionality concerns for the court to consider.110
Lack of guidance on the scope of proportionality elements has led to unduly
harsh forfeitures that undermine the interests of property owners.111
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have been criticized for placing a severe
burden on property owners, especially when the value of the forfeited property

U.S. Currency, No 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999), with One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (stating “a forfeiture proceeding is quasi–criminal
in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law”), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–34 (1886) (holding “[w]e are also
clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s
property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal”).
106. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996); see also Van Oster v. State of Kansas, 272
U.S. 465, 467–68 (1926) (holding that the law “suggest[s] that certain uses of property may be
regarded so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus builds a
secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity
of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.”).
107. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446–47.
108. Innocent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining innocent as “[f]ree from
guilt; free from legal fault”).
109. See generally Van Oster, 272 U.S. 465 (indicating that when a wrongdoer is “one intrusted
[sic] by the owner with the possession and use of the offending vehicle,” the court need not inquire
as to the state’s power to effect the seizure of the innocent owner’s property).
110. 18 U.S.C § 983(g)(2) (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
111. United States v. 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the residence
of a mother of four was subject to forfeiture after drug activity occurred in the house and that such
a punishment was not grossly disproportional); see also United States v. Lot Numbered One (1) of
Lavaland Annex, 256 F.3d 949, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a motel could be forfeited, even
if the corporation was not guilty of any crime) (“Admittedly there is no evidence that RMI [motel]
was guilty of the criminal conduct described in these statutes. However, there is no dispute that the
defendant property was used to conceal and otherwise facilitate the commission of those
violations.”).
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is disproportionate to the alleged criminal connection.112 The Supreme Court
held in Austin v. United States113 that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
excessive fines applies to in rem civil forfeiture proceedings. 114 This is in
contrast to the Court’s long held, dubious assertion that civil forfeitures are
remedial civil sanctions and are not inherently punitive.115 Notably, the Austin
Court declined to articulate a test to determine what constitutes an excessive
forfeiture.116
In an attempt to provide clarity on the nature of an excessive forfeiture, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Bajakajian 117 that a forfeiture is
unconstitutionally excessive if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a
defendant’s offense.”118 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion noted that judicial
measurements of the “gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently
imprecise.”119 This is especially true in the context of civil asset forfeitures,
when there may never be an underlying conviction for the court to consider.120
In effect, the law requires courts to consider proportionality as a factor when
determining the scope of forfeiture, but only so far as to “compare the forfeiture
to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture.”121 As the law currently
stands under CAFRA 2000, there is not enough of an impetus on the court to
analyze forfeiture under multiple proportionality considerations.
K. Not So “Equitable” Sharing
As CAFRA 2000 recognized, civil asset forfeiture is conducted at all levels
of law enforcement, from small town police departments to federal agencies,

112. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1060–61 (discussing some problems with the current
jurisprudential approach to cases of disproportionate forfeiture, particularly in the context of
forfeitures resulting from minor drug offenses); see, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668, 689 (1974) (finding the forfeiture of a lessor’s yacht after a lessee was
arrested on drug charges to be constitutional despite the lessor not having any knowledge of or
involvement in the criminal activity).
113. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
114. Id. at 604.
115. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996) (“In rem civil forfeiture is a remedial
civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does
not constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”), rev’d, United States v.
$405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, No 98–56383, 1999 WL 685967 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999).
116. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993).
117. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
118. Id. at 334.
119. Id. at 336.
120. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(2) (2012 & Supp. II 2016); see, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334
(stating that “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the
principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity
of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).
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such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.122
It can be a windfall for local police agencies that often work with limited
resources. 123 However, when numerous state legislatures acted to curb civil
asset forfeiture, state and local authorities began to engage in a practice known
as “equitable sharing” to circumvent state regulations.124
Equitable sharing involves a state or local agency taking property and then
giving it to federal authorities to institute forfeiture proceedings, which they may
do if the underlying conduct leading to the forfeiture is a violation of federal
law.125 The Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice usually
handle these proceedings.126 If the forfeiture proceedings are successful, then
the state or local law enforcement agency receives a percentage of the profits
back from the federal government. 127 While proponents cite improved
cooperation among state and federal authorities, stiffer federal penalties, and an
expedited forfeiture process as reasons for equitable sharing, there is an obvious
financial motivation.128
When property is transferred to the federal government, CAFRA 2000 holds
that it must be found forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.129 The
preponderance of the evidence standard is easier to meet than the standard set

122. § 983(a) (1)(A)(iv); see Hunter, supra note 24, at 554 (articulating that states “have their
own respective forfeiture statutes distinct from the federal government’s statute.”); George F. Will,
When Government is the Looter, WASH. POST. (May 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/gIQAUIKVZU_story.html (describing
an example of equitable sharing abuse); John Enders, Forfeiture Law Casts a Shadow on
Presumption of Innocence: Legal System: Government Uses the Statute to Seize Money and
Property Believed to be Linked to Narcotics Trafficking. But Critics Say it Short-Circuits the
Constitution, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-18/local/me24209_1_forfeiture-law (observing questionable use of forfeited assets by local law enforcement,
including a southern sheriff using a forfeited Rolls Royce as his personal vehicle).
123. JOHN L. WORRALL, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE: RESPONSE GUIDES SERIES NO. 7: ASSET
FORFEITURE 2 (2008), http://www.popcenter.org/responses/pdfs/asset_forfeiture.pdf; LEVY, supra
note 40, at 148–149; see also HYDE, supra note 14, at 36.
124. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 23.
125. Id.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ABOUT TREASURY EXEC. OFFICE FOR ASSET
FORFEITURE, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/The-Executi
ve-Office-for-Asset-Forfeiture.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2017); Overview Asset Forfeiture
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/afp (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
127. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2012) (“Whenever property is civilly or criminally
forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may . . . transfer the property to any federal
agency or to any state or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or
forfeiture of the property.”); Williams et al., supra note 57, at 25; Hunter, supra note 24, at 558–
59.
128. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 25.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).
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by many states in forfeiture proceedings.130 This means a successful forfeiture
and accompanying windfall is more likely at the federal level.131 Given this
motive, law enforcement agencies frequently choose to conduct forfeiture at the
federal level rather than at the state level. 132 In addition, states often have
provisions mandating that forfeited assets be distributed for purposes other than
law enforcement, such as education or the general treasury fund.133 The federal
government, however, has no such restrictions and mandates that forfeited funds
be used solely for law enforcement purposes.134 Equitable sharing provides the
perfect mechanism to circumvent inconvenient state restrictions of civil asset
forfeiture. 135 In bypassing state law, state and local authorities are profiting
surreptitiously from forfeiture and behaving in a manner inconsistent with
notions of federalism and due process.136
L. The Next Step
CAFRA 2000’s numerous inadequacies elicited calls for reform that
ultimately led Rep. Walberg to introduce CAFRA 2014.137 Although the Act
has bipartisan support, including fifteen Republican and five Democratic
cosponsors in the House of Representatives, it has now sat idle for over three
years.138 CAFRA 2014 proposes several important changes to federal civil asset
forfeiture laws and these revisions are discussed in the following section.
II. CAFRA 2014’S IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE
CAFRA 2014 has seven total provisions and six substantive provisions. 139
The six substantive provisions introduce changes that will affect the following
areas: notice of potential representation by an attorney, burden of proof, innocent

130. See Williams et al., supra note 57, at 22 (observing that Kentucky, New York, Oregon,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Utah, Vermont,
California, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin all require more than preponderance of the
evidence).
131. Id. at 25.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND
AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND FY 2014 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 5 (Jan.
2015) [hereinafter ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND FY 2014
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1508.pdf#
page=1 (stating that “[a]ll property and cash transferred to state and local agencies and any income
generated by this property and cash is to be used for law enforcement purposes”).
135. Williams et al., supra note 57, at 26.
136. Stuteville, supra note 12, at 1185–86.
137. Rulli, supra note 14, at 87; Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th
Cong. (2014); see also 160 CONG. REC. H7392–01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2014).
138. H.R. 5212 (113th): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5212/details (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
139. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014).

2017]

The Next Step in Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform

949

owner defense, proportionality, increased visibility, and equitable sharing
agreements.140
A. Providing Notice of Legal Assistance
The first reform proposed by CAFRA 2014 concerns the notice of legal
assistance requirement.141 The amendment requires the government to provide
notice to claimants of their potential right to legal representation.142 If property
owners are informed of the potential right through a required written notice, then
it is more likely that owners will choose to exercise that right and obtain
assistance of counsel. This benefits claimants since many forfeit their assets
because they cannot afford the expense of contesting the seizure, or otherwise
do not have the knowledge, expertise, or ability to fight the forfeiture. 143
Because CAFRA 2014 requires the government to provide helpful information
to property owners, it is an improvement over CAFRA 2000 and helps to ensure
that claimants are given adequate notice of their legal rights. 144 Although
CAFRA 2014 does not address filing deadlines,145 the legal assistance notice
provision is a step in the right direction.
B. Increasing the Burden of Proof
CAFRA 2014 proposes striking the preponderance of the evidence standard
in favor of the clear and convincing evidence standard.146 Raising the burden of
proof to clear and convincing evidence will require the government to present
more evidence in order to prove that assets are subject to forfeiture.147 Clear and
convincing evidence does not represent an unreasonable burden for officers to
meet and can help restore public trust in law enforcement agencies by making it
140. Id.
141. Id. § 1.
142. The text of the amendment is the following: “The government shall include in any such
notice that the person receiving the notice may be able to obtain free or reduced legal representation
under subsection (b).” Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)1(A)(i).
143. Rulli, supra note 14, at 89; LEVY, supra note 40, at 130–131; Sheth, supra note 22, at 26.
144. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014).
145. See generally id.
146. Id. § 3.
147. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (stating that the clear and
convincing standard requires parties to provide evidence that “could place in the ultimate factfinder
an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’”); compare
Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining clear and convincing evidence as
“indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater
burden than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials”), with id. at Preponderance of
the Evidence (“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior
evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is
still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”).
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less likely that innocent people will have their property taken away. 148
Furthermore, the clear and convincing standard requires less evidence than the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases, 149 meaning that
officers will still need less evidence than what they would normally need for
criminal convictions.150 Since an owner does not need to be charged with a
crime to subject his or her assets to forfeiture, there is an innate possibility that
more innocent people will be drawn into forfeiture proceedings.151 Given this
dilemma, it seems equitable to raise the burden of proof and thereby make it less
likely that innocent people will lose their property to unmerited forfeitures.152
Since one of the overarching principles in civil asset forfeiture is that
forfeitable property must have been acquired by unlawful means or otherwise
used to further illegal activity,153 it is reasonable to increase evidentiary burdens
given the catastrophic impact that unjustified forfeiture has on innocent
owners.154 One might think that legislators would welcome any reform that
protects law-abiding citizens from unwarranted seizures; however, there is a
strong force pushing for evidentiary standards to remain the same.155
While drafting CAFRA 2000, Rep. Hyde initially advocated for the clear and
convincing evidence standard, but was unable to muster enough support for that

148. See Moores, supra note 88, at 784–85 (illustrating the negative public perception of civil
asset forfeiture).
149. For more on application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard, see generally Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). Although there is no
standard definition for reasonable doubt, it has been defined as “such a doubt as will not permit
you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 18. To compare with the clear
and convincing evidence standard, see supra note 146–147.
150. See generally Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,
983–86 (1993).
151. See United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 795 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2015)
(finding currency seized from a traveler to be subject to forfeiture despite never charging him with
a crime); see also Sarah Stillman, Taken: Under Civil Forfeiture, Americans who Haven’t Been
Charged with Wrongdoing can be Stripped of Their Cash, Cars, and Even Homes. Is that All We’re
Losing?, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12
/taken.
152. For some examples of questionable forfeitures that CAFRA 2014 could alleviate, see the
following: United States v. $48,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 756 F.3d 650, 653–55 (8th Cir. 2014);
United States v. $10,700.00 in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
$9,230.00 in U.S. Currency, 58 F. Supp. 3d 945, 948 (D. Neb. 2014).
153. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983(c); 21 U.S.C. § 881; United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S.
Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that in order “[t]o successfully effectuate the
forfeiture of seized currency under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the government must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial connection exists between the seized currency and
drug activity”).
154. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Michael Sallah, & Steven Rich, They Fought the Law. Who Won?,
WASH. POST. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/08/theyfought-the-law-who-won/.
155. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.
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provision.156 Law enforcement agencies and their legislative allies in the Senate
put up a firm resistance to the higher evidentiary burden, and were able to
pressure Rep. Hyde into accepting the lower threshold.157 It is not surprising
that this happened, given that law enforcement agencies have a vested pecuniary
interest in civil asset forfeiture.158 If the standards are kept lower, then it is easier
for them to seize valuables that can be appropriated for their own uses. 159
However, raising the evidentiary standard may also benefit law enforcement by
improving their reputation and restoring public esteem.
As previously stated, if the burden of proof is increased, then the government
will have to present more credible evidence to successfully forfeit property.160
This lessens the likelihood that the government will waste time and resources on
weaker, circumstantial cases that are more likely to be overturned or dismissed
on appeal. 161 Conversely, if the government is required to present more
substantial evidence, then it will be more likely to succeed on the forfeiture cases
that it decides to prosecute. As a result, it will be more difficult to undermine
the government’s position in legitimate forfeiture cases.162
Law enforcement agencies are concerned with maintaining credibility and
their public image with the American people.163 Civil asset forfeiture abuse
undermines trust, making the public uncooperative and discontented.164 Ideally,
having the government meet rigorous standards prior to seizing property will
make it appear more even-handed and impartial in the public’s eye.165 With
156. H.R. REP. NO. 106–192, at 11–12 (1999), reprinted in 199 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 1999 WL
959202; see also Levesque, supra note 11, at 73.
157. Levesque, supra note 11, at 73.
158. HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 14–
15 (2002); see Johnson, supra note 13, at 1069–70.
159. See AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND FY
2014 6 (observing that total assets in the DOJ forfeiture fund “increased in FY 2014 to $8,708.4
million from $6,388.0 million in FY 2013, an increase of 36.3 percent. If seized assets, which are
not yet owned by the Government, are not included, the adjusted assets of the AFF increased to
$7,335.1 million in FY 2014 from $4,952.7 million in FY 2013, an increase of 48.1 percent. This
is attributable to realizing a stable level of recurring forfeited assets in FY 2014 from FY 2013, thus
indicating a strong current and future potential stream of assets flowing into the AFF”); Williams
et al., supra note 57, at 20.
160. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
161. See United States v. 3234 Wash. Ave. N., 480 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding
prosecutors introduced insufficient evidence to justify a forfeiture case against real property);
United States v. $10,648.00 in U.S. Currency, 975 F. Supp. 2d 163, 168 (D.N.H. 2013) (holding
that the government failed to carry its burden for summary judgment regarding forfeiture of cash
allegedly obtained from the drug trade).
162. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text.
163. See generally James K. Robinson, Restoring Public Confidence in the Fairness of the
Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Function, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2008)
(discussing how damage to a law enforcement agency’s credibility can negatively impact its
mission and affect its public perception within the American people).
164. Moores, supra note 88, at 784–85.
165. Id. at 792.
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reputation in mind, several United States Attorneys General have already
dabbled with changes to the civil asset forfeiture process.166 If CAFRA 2014 is
enacted, then police may receive a significant boost in public esteem rather than
the negative publicity associated with controversial seizures.167
C. Innocent Owner Defense
CAFRA 2014 amends the innocent owner defense, so that the burden of proof
shifts to the government after the claimant establishes a prima facie case for the
defense.168 The government would have to prove that the “claimant knew or
reasonably should have known that the property was involved in the illegal
conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.” 169 This revision represents a positive
change for property owners because, as the law currently stands, an innocent
owner is effectively required to prove his or her own innocence.170 It is sensible
to require the government to prove scienter rather than to make an innocent
owner prove a negative.171 CAFRA 2014 will relieve property owners of the
active burden of establishing their own innocence,172 and will allow claimants
to have the favorable position of rebutting the government’s case rather than
meeting the burden of proof.173 If enacted, this measure would protect innocent
owners and eliminate a burdensome and detrimental imposition on claimants.174

166. Eric Holder took steps to limit cash seizures in structuring cases. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Restricts Use of Asset Forfeiture in Structuring Offenses (Mar.
31,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-restricts-use-asset-forfeiturestructuring-offenses. Attorney Generals from as far back as the Clinton administration have
recognized problems within the civil asset forfeiture system and taken steps to correct them. See
Barnet, supra note 24, at 104 (observing that former “Attorney General Janet Reno instructed the
Department of Justice to review and recommend changes to civil forfeiture policies and
procedures”).
167. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
168. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. § 4 (2014). Perhaps
in light of previous common law ambiguity, the language of the bill clearly states “the innocent
owner defense shall be available to a claimant . . .” Id.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
171. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1057–59.
172. Compare H.R. 5212 § 4 (placing the burden of proof on the government to establish that
the claimant is not an innocent owner) with 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (stating “the claimant shall have
the burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence”).
173. United States v. 2001 Honda Accord EX, 245 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
(noting that in CAFRA 2000, “‘Innocent ownership’ remains an affirmative defense, as it was under
all previously enacted forfeiture statutes, notwithstanding the fact that CAFRA [2000] now shifts
the initial burden to the Government in its case-in-chief”). CAFRA 2014 will shift the burden of
proof to the government after the claimant establishes an initial prima facie claim of innocent
ownership, so that the claimant no longer has to affirmatively prove innocence. See H.R. 5212 §
4.
174. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1076–77.
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D. Proportionality Considerations
CAFRA 2014 expands the proportionality requirements into areas such as fair
market value, the range of available sentences, and “hardship to the property
owner and dependents.”175 Appellate courts are required to review excessive
fines arguments—under which many civil asset forfeitures are challenged—at
the de novo standard. 176 Given CAFRA 2014’s additional proportionality
factors, courts will be less likely to uphold grossly excessive forfeitures because
they will have to consider a broader range of proportionality factors.177
Forfeitures not only pose a severe burden to adult property owners,178 but can
also impact property holders’ families and children, subjecting them to suffering
and deprivation without any underlying criminal conviction.179 CAFRA 2014
will allow courts to consider hardship to these people as a component of whether
the forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive. 180 Overall, CAFRA 2014’s
additional proportionality factors represent a positive development for claimants
because courts will be able to undertake more extensive proportionality analyses
and be less likely to uphold excessive forfeitures.181
E. Clarity and Transparency in Reporting Forfeitures
CAFRA 2014 attempts to increase accountability and transparency among law
enforcement agencies that participate in civil asset forfeiture programs.182 It
proposes an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 524, which establishes the asset
forfeiture fund.183 The current law under that section calls for an annual report
documenting the total amount of deposited funds to be issued to Congress and
made available to the public no more than four months after the end of each

175. H.R. 5212 § 5.
176. United States v. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 2010). See Appeal De Novo,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial
court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s rulings.”).
177. The bill would require the court to consider the “seriousness of the offense, the extent of
the nexus of the property to the offense, the range of sentences available for the offense giving rise
to forfeiture, the fair market value of the property, and the hardship to the property owner and
dependents.” H.R. 5212 § 5.
178. See Christopher Ingraham, How the DEA Took a Young Man’s Life Savings Without Ever
Charging Him with a Crime, WASH POST. (May 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonkblog/wp/2015/05/11/how-the-dea-took-a-young-mans-life-savings-without-evercharging-him-of-a-crime/; see generally, Stillman, supra note 151.
179. United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We conclude that . . . intangible
factors, including the property’s character as a residence or the effect of forfeiture on innocent
occupants and children, may be relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis in some cases. This
may be true in civil in rem forfeiture cases where the owner has not been convicted of any crime.”).
180. H.R. 5212 § 5.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 6.
183. Id.; see also 24 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2012).
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fiscal year. 184 However, CAFRA 2014 proposes a slight, but beneficial
clarification.185
The proposed change specifies how forfeiture deposits should be
documented.186 Rather than simply requiring a report on total deposits, CAFRA
2014 mandates a report of specific deposits “from each type of forfeiture, and
specifically identifying which funds were obtained from criminal forfeitures
versus civil forfeitures.”187 This will allow the public to keep track of the use of
civil asset forfeiture and gauge the government’s practices and priorities under
the asset forfeiture system. Although there is no requirement for law
enforcement agencies to document how funds are spent,188 the proposed change
will nonetheless help achieve greater accountability by allowing the public to
keep track of the prevalence of civil asset forfeiture.
F. Curbing Abuse in Equitable Sharing Programs
CAFRA 2014 implements a statutory bar to federal agencies accepting state
forfeitures when law enforcement is acting to circumvent forfeiture
restrictions. 189 Because law enforcement often uses equitable sharing in
duplicitous ways, 190 CAFRA 2014 requires the Attorney General to “assure”
that equitable sharing is not abused by state authorities.191 If implemented, this

184. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(a)(6)(A)(v) (stating “the Attorney General shall transmit to Congress
and make available to the public, not later than 4 months after the end of each fiscal year, detailed
reports” regarding the nature and composition of forfeited property).
185. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
186. H.R. 5212 § 6.
187. Id.
188. Id. (excluding any requirement for documentation of fund expenditures by law
enforcement agencies in the proposed amendment).
189. Id. § 7.
190. Civil forfeiture abuse often results when local law enforcement seizes assets based on
weak premises, transfer the property to the federal government and then receive a substantial cut if
the forfeiture succeeds. Owen Sucoff, From the Courthouse to the Police Station: Combating the
Dual Biases That Surround Federal Money-Laundering Asset Forfeiture, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV.
93, 111–112 (2011).
191. The bills exact language is that “[t]he Attorney General shall assure that any equitable
sharing between the Department of Justice and a local or State law enforcement agency was not
initiated for the purpose of circumventing any State law that prohibits civil forfeiture or limits use
or disposition of property obtained via civil forfeiture by State or local agencies.” H.R. 5212 § 7.
From a cynical perspective, a clever attorney general would likely be aware that the word “assure”
has more than one definition, and can either mean to make a person “sure or certain: convince” or
“to make certain the coming or attainment of: guarantee.” Assure, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997). Using the former definition, an attorney general could
provide assurances that abuse is not occurring, without it being remotely true, and still be in
compliance with CAFRA 2014. The Act would do better to use the word “ensure,” which removes
this potential backdoor for deceitful conduct. See Ensure, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997).
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provision will restrict the controversial aspects of equitable sharing,192 and help
restore the public’s faith in an asset forfeiture system that has come under fire
for abusive practices.193 Apart from benefitting property owners, the change
will be good for government officers by increasing professional standards and
restoring their public image.194 This may in turn encourage cooperation with
law enforcement and boost the government’s credibility.195 Eventually, CAFRA
2014’s changes will help to restore credibility to agencies that have suffered
damage to their reputations based on unconscionable or baseless forfeitures.196
Even the nation’s top law enforcement officials have recognized the need for
action against equitable sharing abuse. In January 2015, then Attorney General
Eric Holder issued a statement prohibiting equitable sharing, except under
certain public safety circumstances.197 While Attorney General Holder’s policy
change was a positive step forward, it did not extend beyond his term in office
and subsequent attorneys general are free to change departmental policy at
will. 198 For example, current Attorney General Jeff Sessions reinstated the
equitable sharing program, drawing criticism from across the political

192. H.R. 5212 § 7 (proposing to eliminate circumvention of state laws limiting civil
forfeitures by local law enforcement agencies).
193. See Nick Sibilla, Seize First Ask Questions Later: Philadelphia Police Take Over $6
Million a Year in Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://ij.org/actionpost/seize-first-ask-questions-later-philadelphia-police-take-over-6-million-a-year-in-civil-assetforfeiture/ (quoting Attorney Scott Bullock, who described the civil asset forfeiture law in
Pennsylvania as a law that has “turned law-enforcement officials into bounty hunters”); Brenda J.
Buote, Tewksbury Motel Owner Glad to Close Book on Seizure Threat, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 31,
2013), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/01/31/tewksbury-motel-owner-gla
d-close-book-seizure-threat/sNrZdQH4XG1EcKMYZVsKFI/story.html (describing a case in
which a federal prosecutor had attempted to seize a motel under a law that allows property to be
seized if it is “linked to drug crimes, even if the owner of the property is not charged with any
crime”); Stillman, supra note 151 (describing several cases in which local law enforcement used
traffic stops based on suspicion of drug-related conduct as a pretext to seize property and the efforts
to challenge civil asset forfeiture laws through class action suits); Dewan, supra note 99 (describing
a number of cases in which federal agencies seized checking accounts of middle-class citizens for
making several bank deposits under $10,000 to avoid triggering a required government report).
194. Johnson, supra note 13, at 1075–77.
195. Id. at 1077–78.
196. See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text.
197. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Prohibits Federal Agency
Adoptions of Assets Seized by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Except Where Needed to
Protect Public Safety (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-prohibitsfederal-agency-adoptions-assets-seized-state-and-local-law (restricting civil asset forfeiture
adoptions by the Department of Justice to property affecting “public safety concerns, including
firearms, ammunition, explosives and property associated with child pornography”); Radley Balko,
Breaking Down Holder’s Move to Limit Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse, WASH. POST. (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/01/16/breaking-down-holders-moveto-limit-civil-asset-forfeiture-abuse/.
198. See Pye, supra note 4 (calling for Congress to enact meaningful reform to civil asset
forfeiture laws).
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spectrum.199 To stop the practice from recurring under future administrations,
CAFRA 2014’s proposed legislation will obligate all future attorney generals to
assure that federal asset forfeiture programs are not being used to circumvent
state laws or administrative processes.200
III. CONCLUSION
CAFRA 2014 has the potential to help safeguard property rights and restore
confidence in a controversial civil asset forfeiture system. If it passes, the
increased notice requirements, higher burden of proof, revamped innocent
owner provision, proportionality considerations, and restrictions on equitable
sharing would combine to bring additional accountability and due process in an
area of law that has always been rife with confusion, uncertainty, and abuse.
While efforts at reform will undoubtedly encounter entrenched resistance from
law enforcement entities and prosecutors,201 the myriad abuses that have come
to light in recent years merit significant reform. Until some meaningful change
improves the system, Americans will continue to suffer injustice in which their
livelihood is ripped from their possession by the force of an opaque, but
powerful, operation of engrained legal fiction.

199. Matt Ford, The Bipartisan Opposition to Session’s New Civil Forfeiture Rules, THE
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/sessions-forfeit
ure-justice-department-civil/534168/.
200. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. § 7 (2014).
201. Legislation Opposed by the National Fraternal Order of Police in the 114th Congress,
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, https://www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=35 (last visited Apr. 4,
2017) (observing that the National FOP opposes “legislation or amendments that would have the
effect of weakening P.L. 106–185, the ‘Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000’”); see also
Moores, supra note 88, at 787–888; Pye, supra note 4.

